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Abstract 
 
We study whether proximity to the nearest tax haven affects FDI and the number of 
American affiliates in a tax haven. Our results show that distance to the nearest tax haven 
is positively related to FDI inflows and the number of American affiliates in tax havens. 
These findings suggest that there is a harmful competition between tax havens. We also 
find evidence of positive spillovers: the number of American affiliates in a tax haven is 
positively related to the number of in its closest neighboring tax haven. This suggests the 
presence of agglomeration benefits given there is an affiliate in a nearby tax haven. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, economic globalization has led to a significant increase in 
capital mobility and a corresponding increase in demand for tax haven operations.  For 
example, Kudrle (2008) reported a 154 percent growth in total liabilities from 1998 to 
2006 for a sample of 20 tax havens.  Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
considered to be an important factor for stimulating economic growth for both developed 
and developing countries (Dash and Sharma, 2011; Lee, 2005; Nissan and Niroomand, 
2010).  Fearing the harmful impacts of tax haven policies, OECD countries launched the 
1998 Harmful Tax Competition (HTC) initiatives.  Following the policy focus, research 
has investigated the impact of tax haven policies on non-tax havens.   
The implication of tax competition for tax havens, themselves, is also important 
for the international dialogue.  To the extent that competition is a race to the bottom, tax 
haven countries would have reason to support calls for international tax policy 
coordination.  If competition is a race to the top, then tax havens would have little reason 
to seek international tax harmonization.  Although the related literature has addressed the 
efficacy of tax haven policies, it has largely ignored the dynamics of tax competition 
between tax havens. 
We address this omission in the literature by analyzing tax competition between 
tax havens paying special attention to physical proximity of countries.  On one hand, 
increased distance to the nearest tax haven acts as a buffer against competitive pressure.  
On the other hand, closer proximity increases the potential for capital agglomeration and 
spillovers between tax havens.  Recent empirical studies by Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2007a,b), Rose and Spiegel (2007), and Blanco and Rogers (2009) find proximity to tax 
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havens to be beneficial for non-tax haven countries.
1
  To our knowledge, however, no 
research investigates the influence of proximity on other tax havens. 
In this article, we postulate that tax havens compete with other tax havens for 
foreign investment and that spatial proximity affects the nature of the competition.  Our 
objective is to empirically evaluate the extent to which geographic proximity to other tax 
havens influences multinational investment flows.  Using a panel data estimation 
framework, we consider two outcome measures: FDI inflows and the number of America 
affiliates.  We build off of previous literature by adding spatial proximity measures to the 
group of factors found to be related to these measures of foreign investment.
2
 Our 
analysis provides evidence regarding the extent of competition and spillover effects 
among tax havens.   
Using panel data for tax haven countries, we find that FDI inflows and the 
number of American affiliates are positively related to the distance to the closest tax 
haven.
3
 Combined these findings imply that tax competition has negative (beggar-thy-
neighbor type) effects on tax havens in terms of competing for mobile capital.  Turning to 
analysis of the location of American affiliates, we find evidence of agglomeration and 
spillover effects.  The number of American affiliates in a tax haven is positively related to 
the number in the closest neighboring tax haven. This is consistent with the spatial 
patterns we find when we investigate the location decisions of the top 500 American 
firms. Namely, there is a positive relationship between the number of American affiliates 
                                                 
1 Rose and Spiegel (2007) investigate impacts of off-shore financial centers while Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2007a,b) and Blanco and Rogers (2009) evaluate tax havens more generally. 
2 Lee (2005) discusses the more prominent factors found in the extensive literature on the determinants of 
FDI. 
3 As described below, tax havens included in the sample vary slightly across specifications. We include 
annual observations for 18 tax havens during the period 1991-2005 in the analysis of FDI and observations 
for 19 tax havens during the period 1999-2005 for the analysis of American affiliates. 
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in a tax haven and the number in its nearest tax haven neighbor.  This supports the 
argument that agglomeration benefits are important when firms are deciding where to 
locate subsidiaries.  From the perspective of tax havens, these results suggest that there is 
a benefit to being closer to another tax haven that already has an American subsidiary.   
This paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the literature on tax havens 
and tax competition, Section 3 presents the data and methodology used to study 
competition between tax havens, Section 4 discusses the results obtained from the 
empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Current Understanding of Tax Havens and Tax Competition 
According to the OECD, a sufficient and necessary condition for a country to be a 
tax haven is that it has little or no tax on relevant income (Ambrosanio and Caroppo, 
2005).  Under the HTC initiative, tax haven countries are characterized as countries that 
are unlikely to share information with other countries for the purpose of taxes, lack 
transparency, or have firms that do not have substantial activity in the jurisdiction 
(Kudrle, 2008).   
Hines (2007a), on the other hand, uses a more general (and perhaps more 
generous) characterization of tax havens: tax havens are small, well governed countries 
with low tax rates.
4
  Besides tax advantages, tax havens offer multinational corporations 
(MNCs) access to good infrastructure and offshore financing activities (Hines, 2005). 
These countries also offer a relaxed regulatory system allowing firms and individuals 
access to business and bank secrecy (Palan, 2002).    
                                                 
4 Dharmapala and Hines (2006) present empirical evidence supporting the argument that tax havens have 
good institutions such as voice and accountability, rule law, government effectiveness, political stability 
and control of corruption. 
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Tax haven regimes are manifested in many different varieties reflecting the 
heterogeneity of countries and firms that seek tax haven opportunities.  Kudrle (2008) 
highlights notable differences in geographic location and income.  Desai et al. (2006a) 
note the relevance of size differences among tax havens in that American MNCs use 
large and small tax havens for different purposes.  Tax havens strategically develop tax 
regimes to target specific sectors and to distinguish themselves from each other.   
Preferential tax regimes fall into several categories (Ambrosanio and Caroppo, 
2005; Palan, 2002): tax havens may have no income or corporate taxes, low taxes, no 
taxes on income of foreign sources, or special tax privileges for certain industries or 
companies.  The main service provided across tax havens also varies (Kudrle and Eden, 
2003).  Production havens have low corporate taxes and grant special privileges so as to 
encourage foreign firms to produce in the country.  Headquarters havens allow foreign 
firms to lower corporate tax earnings in the home jurisdiction.  Sham havens allow 
corporations and individuals to take advantage of the lack of regulation.  Secrecy havens 
are used by individuals and corporations to evade taxes through secrecy laws.   
From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of tax competition on tax havens is 
ambiguous.  In the basic models of tax competition, introduced by Oates (1972) and 
developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) tax competition has a negative effect (See 
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Wilson (1990) for recent literature reviews). Countries 
lower their tax rates to attract capital, which leads to a decrease in government spending 
and the underprovision of public goods.  In contrast, tax competition in a Tiebout (1956) 
world can bring positive effects.  Governments compete for mobile individuals who vote 
with their feet by locating in jurisdictions with the most favorable combination of taxes 
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and public goods provision.  Such fiscal competition leads to an efficient provision of 
public goods and places pressure on governments to keep taxes low.  
Related models of tax competition promote the idea that tax competition “tames 
the leviathan” and leads to a more efficient allocation of resources (Wilson and Wildasin, 
2004).  For example, Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2007) argue that tax competition 
creates a strong incentive to expand output.  Hong and Smart (2006) posit that tax 
planning can be socially optimal.  Eggert and Sorensen (2008) use a theoretical model to 
show that the efficiency of the public sector increases with more tax competition.  
Agglomeration models, in contrast, suggest that tax competition does not 
necessarily lead to lower taxes.  According to Baldwin and Krugman’s (2000) model, 
some countries do not need to reduce taxes since high taxes will be offset by the benefits 
of industrial agglomeration.  In these models, tax competition leads to a “race to the top” 
and not to a “race to the bottom”.  
Empirical evidence shows that tax revenues have not declined with the fall in 
corporate taxes over time due to the broadening of tax bases (Hines, 2007c; Devereux et 
al., 2002).  It is argued that tax competition and levels of FDI are related, where countries 
with lower taxes tend to attract more FDI (Hines, 2007b).  In addition, higher taxes are 
associated with lower levels of affiliate assets and output (Desai et al., 2006a).  Mutti 
(2003) argues that FDI inflows resulting from lowering tax rates have significant positive 
externalities on the economy, such as technology transfers and greater capital 
accumulation.  These positive spillovers allow the economy to grow at a faster rate.  In 
contrast, Lee (2005) suggests that there is only anecdotal evidence regarding the impact 
of tax incentives on foreign investment. 
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The impact of proximity to tax haven activity has also been investigated.  Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2007a,b) argue that increased activity in tax havens spills over to the 
benefit of nearby non-tax havens.  Rose and Spiegel (2007) present evidence that 
proximity to tax havens serving as offshore financial centers (OFCs) leads to greater 
financial depth and competitiveness in the financial sector of a non-OFC country. 
Furthermore, Blanco and Rogers (2009) show that proximity to tax havens has a positive 
impact on the level of FDI of less developed countries.  The impact of proximity to a tax 
haven may be different for tax havens which directly compete for FDI than for non-tax 
havens.   
To summarize, the literature review highlights three main points.  First, the 
impact of tax competition on heterogeneous tax havens is ambiguous.  Second, there is an 
established link between tax haven policies and FDI inflows.  Third, there is evidence 
that proximity to competing tax haven countries may influence FDI inflows.   
 
Empirical Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review, we analyze the impacts of tax competition on tax 
havens using two approaches, both of which consider proximity of a tax haven and its 
closest tax haven neighbor.  Specifically, we investigate how distance between a tax 
haven and its closest tax haven neighbor affects (i) FDI inflows and (ii) the presence of 
American MNCs. The empirical hypotheses that we study are the following:   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Proximity to the nearest tax haven will influence FDI inflows in a tax 
haven country. 
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Hypothesis 2: Proximity to the nearest a tax haven will influence the level of American 
Affiliates in a tax haven country. 
 
The predicted impact of proximity is ambiguous.  Geographical distance is 
commonly used as a proxy for transportation costs in trade flow models (e.g., Mullen and 
Williams, 2011).  Agglomeration and spillover effects are more likely when a country is 
closer to a neighboring tax haven due to lower costs associated with trade. The ability to 
attract foreign investment, however, may be difficult when other tax haven competitors 
are in closer proximity.  If investors first select a favorable region in which to invest 
based on location factors (Nissan and Niroomand, 2010), then tax policies become more 
important and competitive on the margin.  Thus, the net impact of proximity will depend 
on which influences are more important in driving foreign investment outcomes for our 
sample of tax haven countries. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
We define countries to be tax havens according to the classification used in 
Dharmapala and Hines (2006).
5
  To investigate tax competition effects on FDI inflows, 
we use annual FDI observations between 1991 and 2005 for a sample of 18 tax havens.
6
 
Our baseline specification is as follows: 
(1) itititit XTHFDI   'proximity_1  
                                                 
5 Appendix 1 shows the countries identified as tax havens by Dharmapala and Hines (2006). 
6 See Appendix 2 for a list of countries included in our analysis. Some countries in Dharmapala and Hines 
(2006) are not included because of data unavailability.  We include 15 observations per country for a total 
of 270 observations. 
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual FDI inflows. FDI 
inflows were obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  
The tax haven proximity variable (TH_proximity) is the inverse of the natural logarithm 
of the distance to the nearest tax haven.  It is constructed using distances calculated by 
Mayer and Zignago (2006) for 31 of the 35 the tax havens identified in Appendix 1.
7
  A 
positive estimated coefficient on TH_proximity would indicate that FDI inflows are larger 
in tax havens that are closer to the nearest neighboring tax haven.  Therefore, a positive 
(negative) coefficient implies that being closer to another tax haven is beneficial 
(harmful) and that tax havens are good (bad) neighbors for other tax havens.  
The vector X represents a set of control variables identified in previous empirical 
analyses as important determinants of FDI.
8
  In the baseline model, the control variables 
include the natural logarithm of population, exchange rate, and openness to trade.  The 
natural logarithm of the initial level of real GDP per capita is also included as control 
variable.
9
  Furthermore, time fixed effects are considered in the estimation.
10
  A 
description of the variables and their sources is presented in Table 1 and summary 
statistics are given in Table 2.   
We also analyze competition between tax havens by looking at the impact of tax 
haven proximity on the activity of American multinational corporations (MNCs) located 
in tax havens.  For this part of the analysis, the baseline specification in equation 1 is 
                                                 
7 Mayer and Zignago (2006) use the great circle formula to calculate the distance from the most important 
cities and agglomerations of one country to another.  See their note on the calculations at 
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf. Distance is missing for 4 of the tax haven countries 
identified in Appendix 1. Our approach to determine the impact of proximity to a tax haven is similar to 
Rose’s and Spiegel (2006) approach. 
8 Blonigen (2005) presents a comprehensive literature review on the determinants of FDI. 
9 Although several empirical analyses use the current level of GDP as a control variable, we use the initial 
level of GDP because FDI and GDP may be simultaneously determined. 
10 Time fixed effects are eliminated by subtracting the mean of each variable calculated for each country-
year. Country fixed effects could not be included since the distance to a tax haven is time invariant. 
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estimated using the number of American MNCs affiliates in a tax haven as the dependent 
variable.  Annual observations include the years 1999 to 2005 for 19 countries.
11
  The 
number of affiliates of American MNCs was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).
12
 A description of these variables is presented in Table 1, and summary 
statistics for this sample are shown in Table 3. 
 
Assumptions and Spatial Error Model 
We investigate whether a spatial error model is appropriate for our investigation. 
The spatial error model corrects for the potential bias that would result if the FDI inflows 
in one country is correlated with the FDI inflows of nearby countries.
13
 When spatial 
dependence is expected in the disturbance term in an OLS estimator is not efficient and 
produces biased standard errors (Anselin, 1999). Following convention, we use the Wald 
test to find evidence of a spatial correlation in the error term.
14
 
The error term in the spatial error model is specified as follows: 
(2) 
itit uW          
where λ represents the coefficient for the spatially correlated error, and W is a NxN 
weighting matrix.
 
 W is constructed following Blonigen et al. (2007), where W consist of 
TxT matrices of dimension IxI (T represents the number of periods and I the number of 
countries). The diagonal matrices are symmetric matrices of the ratio of the shortest bi-
                                                 
11 The sample period and included countries were  selected based on data availability. 19 countries were 
included for a total of 133 observations (7 observations per country) . See Appendix 2 for a list of countries 
included 
12 The BEA website provides data for foreign affiliates in all countries in which investment was reported 
(name of excel worksheet online, link provided in the references section). 
13 See Anselin (1999) and Anselin et al. (2008) for reviews of spatial econometric models.  Elhorst (2003) 
discusses fixed effects spatial error models.   
14 See LeSage (1999) for a helpful review of how to test for the presence of spatially correlated errors.  
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lateral distance in the sample and the bi-lateral distance from country j to country k, 
where the weight for the countries with the shortest distance is equal to 1.
15
  The other 
matrices that compose W are matrices of zeros of dimensions IxI.  
The spatial error model is estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE) and W is normalized so that each row sums to unity.
16
  If errors are spatially 
correlated, the assumption that the error term is normally distributed is rejected. Given 
the potential for structural instability in the form of non-constant error variances, we 
estimate the spatial error model with robust standard errors.  To check that we are using 
an adequate model, we employ the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) which indicates no 
evidence of multicollinearity.
17
   
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
Table 4 shows the estimation results using total FDI inflows as the dependent 
variable.  In all the estimations shown in Table 4, the Wald statistic (and the significance 
of lambda) provides strong evidence that the error term is spatially correlated.  
Accordingly, we focus our discussion on the spatial error model estimates because the 
presence of spatial correlation implies that OLS estimator is no longer efficient and 
provides biased standard errors.
18
 
                                                 
15 The non-diagonal terms in the diagonal matrices of the W matrix represent the distance between the most 
important cities and agglomerations across counties (provided by Mayer and Zignago, 2006). In the 
estimates using total FDI as dependent variable, the W matrix is composed of 225 matrices of dimension 
18x18.  In the estimates using the affiliates of American MNCs as dependent variable, the W matrix is 
composed by 49 matrices of dimension 19x19.  
16 Our estimates show robust standard errors since the estimator of variance uses the Huber/White estimator 
instead of the traditional calculation. 
17 VIFs for all variables in the models were less than 7 (there is evidence of multicolinearity when the 
largest VIF is greater than 10). See Baum (2006, p.85) for information about this test in Stata. 
18 The OLS estimates are not included for brevity but are available upon request. 
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Column 1, in Table 4, shows the estimates from the baseline specification using 
the spatial error model.  The estimated coefficient for tax haven proximity is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  This indicates that being closer to the 
nearest tax haven is predicted to be associated with lower FDI inflows.  A one standard 
deviation increase in proximity to the closest tax haven would lead to an estimated .5 (or 
approximately .04 million US dollars) decrease in the natural log of FDI inflows.   
We explore the potential nonlinear effect of tax haven proximity by including the 
tax haven proximity variable as well as its squared value in the basic specification. 
Estimates are shown in column 2 of Table 4.  According to the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), the model with the squared term is preferred over the model with the 
only the linear term.
19
  The coefficient on the proximity variable remains negative and of 
the same order magnitude and the squared proximity terms is positive and significant.  
This suggests that the competition effect (represented by the linear term) is mitigated by 
the square of the inverse of the distance term.  Combined, the coefficients suggest that 
closer proximity to the nearest tax haven is associated with greater FDI inflows. We 
interpret this as an indication of spillover effects from tax havens to nearby tax havens.  
To further explore the nature of competition between tax havens we include a 
variable that accounts for FDI inflows to the closest tax haven (in natural log), and these 
estimates are shown in column 3 of Table 4. While the coefficient of the FDI inflows to 
the closest tax is negative, it is not significantly related to total FDI inflows.  
                                                 
19 We explored also a nonlinear form including the cubed of the tax haven proximity variable. According to 
the BIC, the model with the squared term is preferred. The difference between the BICs of the models with 
only the linear form of tax haven proximity and the one with the squared term is equal to 10.33, which is 
indicative of very strong support for the model with the squared term because it is greater than 10. The 
difference of the BICs between the model with the squared term and cubed term is only equal to 1.08. We 
do not include results of the model that includes tax haven proximity to the cube for purpose of space, but 
these results are available upon request.   
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Next, we explore whether our results are robust to excluding those countries that 
are outliers. In our sample, Hong Kong and Luxemburg have levels of FDI inflows that 
are more than one standard deviation above the mean. Estimates excluding Hong Kong 
and Luxemburg as independent observations and using only the linear tax haven 
proximity term are shown in column 4 of Table 4.
20
  When we explore the nonlinear form 
of tax haven proximity using this restricted sample, we find that the model with just the 
linear term is preferred to the model with the linear and the squared term.
21
  Estimates 
using this sample also support the hypothesis that there is competition between tax 
havens.  Combined, with our previous results (c.f. Table 4, column 2), it appears that the 
inclusion of Hong Kong and Luxemburg drives the apparent spillover effects found in the 
non-linear specification of proximity.  Thus, while Hong Kong and Luxemburg enjoy the 
benefit of spillovers from the nearby tax havens, the other tax havens are more influenced 
by tax competition pressure. 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the spatial error model using the number of 
American MNCs affiliates in tax havens as dependent variable.  In all the estimations 
shown in Table 5 we reject the hypothesis of no spatially correlated error terms at the 1 
percent level.  As shown in column 1, the estimated coefficient on tax haven proximity is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  Increasing the tax haven proximity 
variable by one standard deviation results in an estimated increase in the natural log of 
number of affiliates by 0.34; representing a predicted increase of one affiliate 
(approximately 0.06).  Estimates including the squared term of tax haven proximity are 
                                                 
20 Hong Kong and Luxemburg are still present in the model in that they are the closest tax haven for some 
of the tax havens included in the sample.  Thus, we don’t simulate a world without their FDI flows. 
21 We consider the models with the squared of tax haven proximity and with the cubed term. Looking at the 
BICs, the linear model is preferred over the other models because it has a lower BIC. Estimates not 
included for purpose of space, but available upon request.  
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shown in column 2 of Table 5. According to the BICs for the two models, shown in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, there is strong support for the model with the squared term.
22
 
Once again, there is evidence of spillover effects among tax havens.
23
 
Column 3 of Table 5 show the estimates when the natural log of affiliates in 
closest tax haven is included as an explanatory variable instead of the tax haven 
proximity variable.  The estimated coefficient for the affiliates variable is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Notably this finding seemingly contradicts the previous 
findings, where being closer to the nearest neighboring tax haven was associated with 
less economic activity in a tax haven.  According to agglomeration models of tax 
competition, however, firms tend to concentrate in specific areas.  Estimates from column 
3 suggest that as if there is a one standard deviation increase in the natural log of the 
number of affiliates in the closest tax haven, then the number of affiliates in a tax haven 
increases by 0.3; which represents an increase of one half affiliate (approximately 0.5).   
We also explore whether there is a nonlinear effect of the number of tax haven 
affiliates in the closest tax haven, and find support for a model that includes the square 
and the cube of the number of affiliates of American MNCs.
24
 Estimates for the model 
that considers the cubed term of the number of American MNCs affiliates in the closest 
tax haven as shown in column 4 of Table 5 is similar to previous results.  Including the 
cubed proximity term, we observe a positive impact when the closest tax haven has 
between 0 to 10 affiliates. If the number of affiliates in the closest tax haven is greater 
                                                 
22 Absolute difference between BICs is equal to 7.18. 
23 We also explore with a model that included the cubed term of tax haven proximity variable, but find no 
support for this model since it had higher BIC than the model with the squared term of tax haven proximity. 
24 We evaluate the BICs of three models: 1) with the linear term of the number of affiliates in the closest 
tax haven, 2) with the squared term, and 3) with the cubed term. According the BICs, there is very strong 
support for the model that includes the cube term. Estimates for the model with the squared term not 
included for purpose of space, but are available upon request. 
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than 10, then we observe a negative relationship between the number of affiliates in a tax 
haven and the number of its closest tax haven neighbor. Thus, this nonlinear model shows 
that the spillover effect is limited and not indefinite.   
To check for robustness, we estimate our model excluding those countries with 
the largest number of American MNCs affiliates.  Specifically, we exclude Hong Kong, 
Ireland, and Switzerland because they show a very high number of American affiliates 
relative to the other countries in our sample. Estimates using this restricted sample are 
shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.  Excluding these countries from the sample, the 
linear models have a better fit.  The results suggest that being nearer to the closest tax 
haven leads to an estimated decrease in the number of American MNCs affiliates. On the 
other hand, as the number of American MNCs affiliates increases in the closest tax 
haven, we observe an increase in American MNCs affiliates in a specific country. 
Geography plays an important role in reconciling the different impacts of 
American affiliates.  The combined results suggest that tax havens compete with each 
other to attract MNCs in the first place (the negative impact of proximity of nearest tax 
haven on affiliate levels in the linear model that excludes Hong Kong and Luxemburg). 
When making a decision concerning where to locate in a specific region, MNCs evaluate 
the tax haven options, which results in observed competition between tax havens.  
However, there are positive agglomeration effects: tax havens with higher levels of 
affiliates in the closest tax haven neighbor have higher levels themselves (the positive 
effect of the number of American affiliates in the nearest tax haven). Thus, if a firm is 
already in a tax haven and it wants to expand, then it is likely that the firm will be 
interested in having an affiliate in nearby low tax jurisdictions (i.e. tax haven).   
 15 
To study these opposing forces in more depth, we investigate the presence of the 
top 500 American companies in tax havens as specified by the Forbes 500 list of 2008.  
We investigate the number of affiliates that each of these companies has in a tax haven 
according to the directory of American firms operating in foreign countries.
25
 Forty-six 
percent of the top 500 American firms have at least one affiliate in a tax haven, and 36 
percent have an affiliate in more than one tax haven.  In fact, the probability of having 
more than one tax affiliate, given that the firm has one tax haven affiliate, is equal to 77 
percent.  The tax haven countries with the highest number of American subsidiaries are 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, and Ireland (in descending order).
26
  There is an 
apparent synergy between tax haven subsidiaries in these locations.  Given that a firm has 
a subsidiary in Singapore, there is a 79 percent probability of having a subsidiary in Hong 
Kong; and given that the firm has a subsidiary in Hong Kong, there is a 77 percent of 
probability that the firm has a subsidiary in Singapore.  In the case of Ireland and 
Switzerland, we find similar results.  Given that a firm has a subsidiary in Ireland, there is 
a 66 percent of probability of having a subsidiary in Switzerland; and given that a firm 
has a subsidiary in Switzerland, there is a probability of 58 percent that the firm has a 
subsidiary in Ireland.    
 
4. Conclusion 
There are two main empirical findings from this analysis.  First, proximity to the 
closest tax haven is negatively related to FDI inflows and the number of American 
                                                 
25 This directory is provided by the Uniworld Business Publications, where the 19th edition published in 
2007 was the latest edition available at the time this study was undertaken. 
26 In Hong Kong there are 158 firms that have an affiliate, in Singapore 154, in Switzerland 125, and 
Ireland 111. These four destinations are important since in the next most attractive destination, Luxemburg, 
there is only presence of 37 firms.  
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subsidiaries in a tax haven. These results suggest that there is race to the bottom between 
tax havens, where they all compete for mobile capital and geographic location relative to 
other countries matters.  The policy implication is that as a group, tax haven countries 
experience potentially harmful impacts from tax competition and have reason to support 
initiatives aimed at international tax harmonization between themselves.  
Our second main finding is that agglomeration benefits are evident for firms when 
they decide where to locate subsidiaries.  As the number of American affiliates in the 
closest tax haven increases, there is an increase in the number of affiliates in a tax haven. 
This result suggests that there are positive spillovers among neighboring tax havens. 
Given that a firm is already located in a tax haven, there is a higher probability that it will 
expand operations to a nearby tax haven.  Accordingly, tax havens may benefit by being 
nearer to other tax havens with high presence of American firm affiliates. This 
agglomeration benefit is likely to be observed once a MNC has already settled in the 
nearby tax haven. This effect contrasts with the competition effect, where tax havens 
compete for the initial capital investment and future capital inflows. In sum, our findings 
suggest that agglomeration benefits are important for firms and that the nature of the 
competition between tax havens changes once there is a subsidiary in the nearby tax 
haven.  In addition, the pressure of tax competition appears to be less distinct for the 
countries that attract a disproportionate amount of FDI (Hong Kong and Luxemburg). 
Our analysis provides important insights related to the global economy and how 
tax havens interact with each other. We find that tax havens compete with each for capital 
flows, which is consistent with Dash and Sharma’s (2011) finding for developing 
countries. The evidence provided by this study tells us that government policy in tax 
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havens is likely to be shaped by the competition they face, where these countries will find 
ways to make themselves more attractive than the nearby tax haven. There is likely to be 
strategic behavior across tax havens in relation to taxation and other incentives to FDI.  
Our analysis also shows that there are significant spillovers in nearby tax havens 
once a MNC has chosen to locate in a specific tax haven. This suggests that tax havens 
would likely benefit by marketing themselves to corporations who have operations in 
nearby tax havens. Agglomerations effects are evident from our analysis, where tax 
havens can benefit from activity in nearby tax havens if they are able to make themselves 
appealing. We might observe that tax havens nearby have incentives that target specific 
industries with the purpose to take advantage of agglomeration.     
There are many fruitful avenues for further research.  In particular, extensions 
should explore the implications of tax competition between tax haven regimes with 
different characteristics.  As discussed in the literature review, the group of tax havens is 
a heterogeneous group and determining the relevance of location for competition between 
these countries is important.  In addition, future research might evaluate not only the 
location of American MNCs but also their level of sales, employment or assets in tax 
havens.  Such factors are undoubtedly important for gaining a better understanding of the 
role of tax competition and geography among tax havens. Finally, looking at whether 
nearby tax havens have a tendency to offer similar incentives might be a way to learn 
more about the existent competition and spillovers effects.  
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Table 1. Variable description and source 
    
 
Variable name 
 
Variable description and source 
Ln(FDI) Natural log of the inflow of foreign direct investment (US 
dollars, millions). Source: UNCTAD.         
                                                                                                                                                     
Ln(Affiliates) Natural log of the number of affiliates of American MNCs. 
Source: BEA. 
 
TH_proximity Inverse of the natural log of the distance (in kilometers) to the 
closest tax haven (as defined by Dharmapala and Hines, 2006, 
see Appendix 1). We use the distance calculated with the 
latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities and 
agglomerations. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
 
Ln(FDI in closest 
TH) 
Natural log of the inflow of foreign direct investment in closest 
tax haven (US dollars, millions). Source: UNCTAD. 
 
Ln(Affiliates in 
closest TH) 
Natural log of number of affiliates of American MNCs in 
closest tax haven. Source: BEA. 
 
Ln(exchange rate) Natural log of exchange rate. Source: WDI. 
Ln(GDP initial) Natural log of the initial level of real GDP per capita (constant 
2000 US dollars). Source: WDI. 
 
Ln(openness) Natural log of exports plus imports divided by real GDP. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Ln(population) Natural log of population. Source: WDI. 
Institutions Average of six different indicators of governance (rule of law, 
control of corruption, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, political stability, and regulatory quality). 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics – Sample: FDI inflows (from all countries) in tax havens  
          
     
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(FDI) 5.038 2.652 0.000 11.693 
TH_proximity 0.186 0.039 0.126 0.243 
Ln(FDI in closest TH) 4.979 3.436 -3.114 11.693 
Ln(GDP initial) 8.667 0.969 7.134 10.458 
Ln(population) 13.145 1.684 10.600 15.822 
Ln(exchange rate) 1.149 1.976 -1.143 7.462 
Ln(openness) 4.887 0.363 3.924 5.953 
Institutions 0.649 0.590 -0.369 1.796 
All variables have 270 observations 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics – Sample: American MNCs activity in tax havens  
          
     
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln(Affiliates) 2.353 2.165 0.000 6.314 
TH_proximity 0.183 0.041 0.123 0.243 
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH) 3.233 2.468 0.000 6.314 
Ln(GDP initial) 9.602 2.228 4.958 15.773 
Ln(population) 13.298 1.694 10.652 15.822 
Ln(exchange rate) 1.311 2.021 -1.065 7.318 
Ln(openness) 4.841 0.413 3.860 5.953 
Institutions 0.559 0.784 -1.596 1.830 
All variables have 133 observations 
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Table 4. Spatial Error Model Estimates: FDI inflows
1 
 
          
     
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TH proximity -12.922*** -12.868***  -11.665*** 
 (4.607) (4.020)  (4.385) 
TH proximity(sq)  499.485***   
  (142.223)   
Ln(FDI in closest TH)   -0.017  
   (0.048)  
Ln(GDP initial) 0.447 0.712** 0.315 0.677*** 
 (0.305) (0.298) (0.324) (0.254) 
Ln(population) 0.511*** 0.465*** 0.637*** 0.408*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.092) 
Ln(exchange rate) 0.241*** 0.291*** 0.167* -0.044 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.088) (0.103) 
Ln(openness) 2.021*** 2.813*** 1.861*** -0.628 
 (0.466) (0.505) (0.457) (0.758) 
Institutions 1.569*** 0.928 1.639** 0.296 
 (0.599) (0.593) (0.659) (0.553) 
Constant -0.035 -0.790*** -0.028 0.412* 
 (0.173) (0.247) (0.169) (0.221) 
Lambda (λWε) 0.444*** 0.408*** 0.415*** 0.381*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.079) (0.093) 
     
Observations 270 270 270 240 
Log-likelihood -515.70 -507.70 -521.60 -454.90 
Wald statistic (Chi-square) 35.73 29.45 27.77 16.78 
BIC 1081.81 1071.48 1093.67 959.05 
1
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable: FDI inflows (natural log) 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Spatial Error Model Estimates: Annual American Affiliates
1
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TH proximity -8.315*** -10.065***   -11.022***  
 (2.462) (2.456)   (2.531)  
TH proximity(sq)  320.541***     
  (105.487)     
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)   0.124*** 0.822***  0.082** 
   (0.034) (0.134)  (0.033) 
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)
2
    -0.108**   
    (0.051)   
Ln(Affiliates in closest TH)
3
    -0.103***   
    (0.019)   
Ln(GDP initial) -0.408*** -0.243** -0.490*** -0.425*** 0.031 -0.135 
 (0.111) (0.099) (0.114) (0.087) (0.119) (0.113) 
Ln(population) 1.044*** 1.017*** 1.148*** 1.018*** 0.645*** 0.908*** 
 (0.064) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.109) (0.110) 
Ln(exchange rate) 0.527*** 0.249* 0.562*** 0.477*** -0.088 0.06 
 (0.169) (0.142) (0.173) (0.130) (0.158) (0.149) 
Ln(openness) 1.084*** 0.312 0.982*** 1.657*** -0.284 -0.452 
 (0.200) (0.325) (0.222) (0.253) (0.605) (0.623) 
Institutions 2.472*** 2.404*** 2.373*** 1.899*** 1.011*** 1.344*** 
 (0.413) (0.331) (0.426) (0.311) (0.382) (0.439) 
Constant -0.007 -0.544** -0.007 0.719** -0.344 -0.182 
 (0.175) (0.264) (0.189) (0.326) (0.259) (0.250) 
Lambda (λWε) 0.554*** 0.602*** 0.583*** 0.584*** 0.687*** 0.673*** 
 (0.104) (0.095) (0.101) (0.097) (0.091) (0.098) 
Observations 133 133 133 133 112 112 
Log-likelihood -178.60 -172.50 -181.00 -163.80 -134.70 -143.50 
Wald statistic (Chi-square) 28.41 39.93 33.54 36.14 56.92 47.21 
BIC 401.12 393.94 405.97 381.34 311.91 329.38 
1
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable: Number of affiliates (natural log) 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively
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Appendix 1. Countries Classified as Tax havens by Darmaphala and Hines (2006) 
   
Andorra   Channel Islands*   Lebanon   Netherlands Antilles 
Anguilla   Cook Islands   Liberia   Panama   
Antigua and Barbuda Cyprus   Liechtenstein*   St. Kitts and Nevis   
Bahamas   Dominica  Luxembourg  St. Lucia   
Bahrain   Gibraltar   Macao   St. Vincent and Gren.  
Barbados   Grenada   Maldives   Singapore   
Belize   Hong Kong Malta   Switzerland  
Bermuda   Ireland   Marshall Islands   Turks and Caicos 
British Virgin Islands  Isle of Man*   Monaco*  Vanuatu   
Cayman Islands  Jordan   Montserrat     
*Distance data from Mayer and Zignago (2006) is not available.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Sample of Tax Havens use in Estimates* 
 
Antigua and Barbuda Hong Kong Luxembourg St. Lucia 
Bahrain Ireland Macao St. Vincent and Gren. 
Belize Jordan Malta Switzerland 
Dominica Lebanon Panama Vanuatu 
Grenada Liberia
i
 St. Kitts & Nevis 
i 
Not included in estimates of  FDI inflows 
*Sample for total FDI includes 18 countries and sample for American MNC affiliate 
includes 19 countries. 
 
 
 
 
